Eighteenth-Century Origins of the Self and Other in the third Earl of Shaftesbury and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

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A primary concern in postmodernist theory and moral philosophy is the relationship between the individual, as self, and the other, the externalized world outside the reasoning subject. The debate between Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas crystallizes this discussion in which Foucault sees the connection of self and other as a proliferation of power. In this relationship, the individual and the community outside of her are in constant relational positionings of power, where the gaze of the other plays an important role in connecting the other to the subject. Habermas wants to define this relationship in terms of intersubjectivity and solidarity, in which thought processes within individuals themselves facilitate the connection of the subject and the other in discourse. This intersubjective notion represents the latest attempt to provide an alternative to John Rawls’ theory of justice, which has been criticized by critics on many fronts (Moon 157-159). In order to better understand this latest theory, one must look for the origins of Habermas’ conception of the individual in relation to a community. One can see the influences on this thought in the defining moment in Western philosophy’s conception of the self and other in the third Earl of Shaftesbury and G. W. Leibniz’ moral philosophies.

As many critics note, such as Ernest Tuveson, the initial stirrings of the discussion on the connection between the self and the other find their birth in the problems of egoism that Thomas Hobbes and John Locke initiate in their thought (75). Hobbes, of course, maintains that humans see the world through brutish and self-serving eyes, where the connection between the self and the other reflects a mere assertion of wills as one group attempts to assert its localized ideals upon the other. Locke complicates this conception as well in his notion of innate ideas. That is, humans enter the world like a blank slate, tabula rasa, without any common, connecting notions that would create a bridge between the desires of the individual and the desires of the community. This is the notion of the self and
the other that the third Earl of Shaftesbury seeks to remedy in the formulation of his moral philosophy.

The third Earl of Shaftesbury studies under Locke and closely examines Locke's arguments on innate ideas and the construction of thought in empiricism, collecting primary and secondary ideas to construct concepts. Shaftesbury sees this approach as problematic because it does not readily allow for people to come together in discourse to agree upon ideas that everyone within a community could accept. As a response to Locke and Hobbes' formulations, Shaftesbury posits a theory of sensibility, or enthusiasm—a latent, innate sense of intrinsic quality in experience apart from selfish interest. Everyone possesses this intrinsic quality because everyone exists or operates within a system of social interaction.

Leibniz sees this notion of Shaftesbury as an important step forward in providing a connection between the individual and the other. Like Shaftesbury, Leibniz acknowledges that the intrinsic notion of sensibility could be disrupted in some manner by the inability of individuals to use right reason to interpret the natural world that God has created (Brown 438). Shaftesbury avoids the problem of having individuals exercise wrong reason through his concept of self reflection—that is, reflection upon self and natural affections. Leibniz, on the other hand, avoids this misuse of reason through positing that God creates a natural connection of love that forces the individual to recognize the desires of the community which are the dictates of God. Importantly though, Leibniz recognizes in Shaftesbury this role of sensibilities to provide foundations for discourse between the self and the other (apart from how these sensibilities could be distorted). One can achieve a clearer understanding of this notion of sensibility which connects the individual to the other in Shaftesbury's philosophy through seeing its later, altered form in Habermas' concept of solidarity. Through applying Habermas' theory to Shaftesbury's and Leibniz' moral philosophies, one can trace the development of this important idea of connecting the self and the other and can clarify the distinctions between Shaftesbury and Leibniz, noting why Shaftesbury's concept, rather than Leibniz' proves more effective as a tool for later moral philosophers to use.

Indeed Leibniz relies upon the role of God as a facilitator between the individual and the community, whereas Shaftesbury relies upon a notion of the passions (enthusiasm) coupled with the notion of a universal mind. Shaftesbury's conception of natural and unnatural affections reflects a Habermasian conception of solidarity, externalizing the notion of good in the individual to the notion of good in the community. Shaftesbury and Leibniz both see this process as flawed in some instances (especially since they both work to argue against the self-serving egoism in Hobbes), but Shaftesbury's theory posits a practical methodology much more in line with Habermas, because the Englishman provides a means for the participant in discourse to work through his or her desires to make them conform to the community, whereas Leibniz relies upon founding this connection solely upon the participants' understanding of the love of God. In essence, through this use of the role of God, Leibniz experiences similar problems that he tries to avoid in Hobbes, where, resembling Hobbes' sovereign, Leibniz uses the love of God as the controlling factor in connecting the subject and the other. In such a construction, the connection between the self and other can only be made by something external to the person's mind itself. In contrast, Shaftesbury empowers the participants by providing them with a functional and personal methodology to connect the subject to the other, this connection begins in the autonomy of the individual's mind.

Shaftesbury's most important ideas which explain his connection between the self and other appear in “Inquiry Concerning Virtues”, which was originally published in 1699 and again in a collection of other essays in Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1711). The first step in understanding Shaftesbury's notions of the individual and the other in “Inquiry” requires that one look at his notion of “System.” Shaftesbury treats the living world holistically as a unified ecological system (Redding 86). In this system, the world exists as an interdependent, correlating body, in which, like a living body, the different parts rely upon the others to function properly in unison, “there is a system of all animals: an animal order or economy according to which the animal affairs are regulated and disposed” (1: 169). That is, an order exists within “animal affairs” where the interdependent processes of life are “regulated and disposed.” As one moves outside the functions of animals, one can continue to observe this order until he or she finally encounters a “system of all things, a universal nature” (1: 169) – a complex web of inanimate and animate objects that are all interconnected.

For Shaftesbury, the human subject's body and mind inhabit such a complex web of order, standing, like other living things, in necessary relations to objects surrounding them. This relation proves necessary because the human subject must rely upon that external world to function...
properly within a system, as the limbs of the body are necessary for the functioning of the entire body. Like any other animal which has “relation to some other being or nature besides his own” or which “points beyond himself,” the human being will “undoubtedly be esteemed a part of some other system” (1: 168). This characteristic of “pointing beyond itself” emphasizes the participation of the human in the system, not only physically, but mentally as well. Since the human mind, for Shaftesbury, exists within an interdependent relation to other minds, then, human minds ultimately form a system of minds, as one moves outward, beyond the individual. It is important to note, that with this notion of system, Shaftesbury effectively creates a new perspective upon the mind and the body in Western thought. He claims that minds cannot be conceived as substantially distinct from people’s bodies, and since the human’s mind itself points beyond itself to other things, no metaphysical barrier exists which would prevent the individual mind from directly engaging with other minds in a world where “everything is governed, ordered or regulated for the best by a designing principle or mind” (1: 165). Through these relations between minds, the individual can participate within the divine or universal mind, a mind which is essentially the system of all living minds (Redding 87). Hence, through Shaftesbury’s formulation of system, he can connect the individual as a thinking subject to a general community of minds; individuals within a system are necessarily connected physically and mentally because they function within the same order as others.

With this conception of the individual’s mind as a portion of a whole, living mind-system, Shaftesbury can stress the importance of the role of the individual as he externalizes his ideas into an outside space, inhabited by other minds seeking their own desires. In this interconnected system of minds, the individual mind reaches out to engage with objects in the world from its rootedness in the human body and from the biased perspective of this body: “We know that every creature has a private good and interest of his own which Nature has compelled him to seek, by all the advantages afforded him within the Compass of his make. We know that there is in reality a right and a wrong state of every creature, and that his right-one is by nature forwarded and by himself affectionately sought” (1: 167). Here, Shaftesbury acknowledges that the thinking subject is a desiring subject, which seeks a “private good and interest of his own.” At the same time, Shaftesbury wants to emphasize that since each individual stands within a larger, living system, humans can focus on their private affections and work toward their own private good, while at the same time, they can develop natural social affections directed towards the good of the system of which they are a part -- the system that relies on their individual existence and identity (Redding 87). When minds seek something (good or bad), then the mind’s yearnings affect the entire system as a whole: “if any being be wholly and really ill, it must be ill with respect to the universal system, and then the system of the universe is ill or imperfect” (1: 169). Though the subject seeks to fulfill its desires within the system, it must seek the desires “forwarded” by “nature” because the correct desires will keep the individual from making herself or the entire “system of the universe” “ill.”

Here, this notion of “nature” plays an important role, but before examining this idea, one must examine people’s minds in the world, where feelings or affections play a connecting role between the isolation of the individual’s mind and its position within the system of human minds. Shaftesbury rejects the idea of an absolute viewpoint from which the world can be perceived free of subjective conditions (Redding 89). Subjective experiences become meaningful because people exist within a system, and this system becomes larger as one moves outward from the individual’s mind; but no final position of discernment exists where one can perceive all minds or where one can observe all minds objectively. Each person views the system from their isolated positions and their isolated attempts to seek private goods. As a result, people can, of course, make errors when perceiving the world and investigating values; errors of discernment occur because people are, in some sense, limited in their views (Redding 89). Since people have limited perspectives in viewing the world, they need to possess a methodology that would circumvent these problems in formulating desires. That is, they would need a practice that would allow them to externalize positive desires into a public setting. Shaftesbury accomplishes this through his notion of sympathy or enthusiasm.

Shaftesbury argues that sympathy, enthusiasm, or passions for the other (an understanding of “nature”), plays a necessary role in connecting with the minds of others in the system, through communicating. In order to exhibit how one can communicate through sympathy, Shaftesbury distinguishes between two sets of emotions in his theory: private and natural affections. Private affections are rooted in the desires of the individual and his or her idea of private good, while natural affections are rooted in the good of the community (2: 196). Since individuals’ desires play a necessary
role in the system, they play a necessary role in virtue, and virtue, for Shaftesbury is rooted in the nature of humans' sociability that arises from their affections (Klein 56). Since humans inhabit a system of interlocking and interconnecting minds, then, in order to perpetuate goodness within the entire system, one would have to reflect natural affections that conform to the affections within the system's whole. These natural affections are brought about through a "communicative or social principle" (2: 193) — a sociability — where people derive pleasure in society from "that enjoyment of participation and community which is so essential to our happiness" (2: 205). People enjoy "pleasures of sympathy" through an "enjoyment of good by communication, a receiving it, as it were, by reflection or by way of participation in the good of others, and a pleasing consciousness of the actual love, merited esteem or approbation of others" (2: 204). Here communication between the individual and the other involves a participation in the "good of others." People that communicate are sociable because they can expect to participate positively through discourse with others, a "pleasing consciousness." The mind is constantly engaged communicatively with other minds with whom the individual shares sympathetic emotions and affections.

In order to enjoy the connection through communication, the individual's relation to others relies upon his or her ability to order his or her natural affections, to create an "economy." One must conform his private affections to the external natural affections, "a creature must have all his inclinations and affections, his dispositions of mind and temper, suitable and agreeing with the good of his kind or of that system in which he is included and of which he constitutes a part" (2: 192). Because of his or her necessary role in the system, the individual must order his or her affections in such a way to make them "good" for the "system." In communicating socially with the other, the individual's passions become an important device in ordering the affections, "in the passions and affections of particular creatures, there is a constant relation to the interest of a species or common nature" (2: 192). That is, the affections or emotions of the individual connect the individual to "common nature." Shaftesbury gives examples of these natural emotions; in "the case of natural affections, parental kindness, zeal for posterity, concern for the propagation and nurture of the young, love of fellowship and company, compassion, mutual succour and the good of the species or common nature is as proper and natural to him as it is to any organ, part or member of an animal body." (2: 192). Here, the ordering process of the affections involves recognizing "fellowship" or connectedness between human minds, and this friendship is never linked to status or hierarchy (Dunn 130). Through recognizing this disinterested, emotional inclination in each other, a natural affection, then individuals would want to order their private affections to conform to those externally-driven passions of fellowship.

Even though the emotions provide a bridge between the individual and the other, the affections only form the foundations of human morality; reason must be used to properly order these affections according to this fellowship. Human morality, though it arises in the feelings, is a phenomenon of consciousness and rationality as well because "sound and well-established reason" alone constitutes a "just affection" (1: 176). As noted earlier, while humans are naturally sociable and naturally capable of virtue, they are not, to speak precisely, naturally good or virtuous; one must construct an "economy of the passions" (2: 198). Virtue requires training and work, for virtue is not merely an affective disposition, but affection raised to a conscious principle in the rational agent by reflection on disinterested natural affection and the sorts of actions endorsed by affection (Klein 56). Thus in the "Inquiry," the individual as thinking subject and individual as a necessary member of a communicative system play complementary roles. Moral insight, for Shaftesbury, requires, first, that one see himself or herself as a thinking subject, and then he or she must move into a relation within a system of minds; one must order his or her internal parts to, then, reflect his or her external relations. One must first, take himself or herself off from external authority and deploy the resources of the interior (affection and reason). The fundamental insight of moral feeling and reflection is one's connectedness to others and the fundamental demand that one act rationally to benefit them (Klein 57). For Shaftesbury, "social love, friendship, gratitude or whatever else is of this generous kind does by its nature take place of the self-interesting passions, draw us out of ourselves" (2: 193). That is, people formulate desires within their private good, but must order or organize these desires within an external context through recognizing the natural emotions, such as "social love," "friendship," "kindness," "compassion." Only then, will we be drawn "out of ourselves" and properly ground human morality, when we determine which natural and self affections might be too strong or too weak (2: 200), when we exclude "self passions" that prove "too intense or strong" (2: 216).
This proper balance or ordering of the affections, ultimately creates the means of connection between the individual and the other. People must learn to exclude unnatural affections (Klein 58), because “to have those horrid, monstrous and unnatural affections is to be miserable to the highest degree” (2: 229). Through recognizing the correct affections to possess in an environment of others, the individual places herself within a cultural discourse. Indeed, the altering of affections invites a cultural discourse since it offers categories by which individuals can be located with respect to social or cultural formations (Klein 59). Through examining affections, people can recognize when their passions do not conform with the community, and people can alter these affections to help situate them better within the system. Hence, in stressing the affections, Shaftesbury stresses the importance of moral autonomy, because the individual’s mind becomes a place where different “opinions” of society can be evaluated. Here Shaftesbury places the seat of the connection between the self and the other, the individual’s passionate and autonomous mind. Shaftesbury constructs his connection between the subject and the object by grounding this link upon the individual’s emotions. Leibniz, on the other hand, moves for a foundation that lies outside the individual, and he constructs this connection through the notion of natural law.

Important in Leibniz’ moral philosophy is his formulation of a law of nature, or the order of the universe through which humans can come to know God. Leibniz, like Shaftesbury, attempts to side step the self-isolating problems that arise from Hobbes and Locke, and the German philosopher attempts to do this through his notion of “Pre-established Harmony” which he uses to construct his entire philosophy:

By nature every simple substance has perception, and that its individuality consists in the perpetual law which brings about the sequence of perceptions that are assigned to it, springing naturally from one another, to represent the body that is allotted to it, and through its instrumentality the entire universe, in accordance with the point of view proper to this simple substance and without its needing to receive its part adapts itself to the wishes of the soul by its own laws, and consequently only obeys it according to the promptings of these laws. Whence it follows that the soul has in itself a perfect spontaneity, so that it depends only upon God and upon itself in its actions. (Theodicy 304)

Here “simple substances” (later monads) reflect the natural law of the world around them. This substance “adapts itself to the wishes of the soul” or the all encompassing law, and the “simple substance” arranges itself in accordance to the “promptings of these laws.” A mirror-like relationship exists where the harmony of God’s law is reflected within the individual substances. Simply put, God’s law reflects or equals natural law. Leibniz uses this concept of natural law to ultimately reinforce his overarching notion that God creates this world as the best of all possible worlds: God “is determined by this same goodness, united to an infinite wisdom, and by the very concourse of all the previous and particular inclinations towards each good, and towards the preventing of each evil, to produce the best possible design of things” (“Reflections” 402). Since God has created the “best possible design of things” within the construct of his law and natural law, and humans can have access to this natural law through their existence as substances in the universe, then God’s nature represents a perfect form, from which people can extract “wisdom” and “goodness.”

Through this notion of ordered “goodness” of natural law based upon pre-established harmony, Leibniz wishes to argue against a world where “wisdom, goodness, justice [or right] are only fictions in relation to God and the universe” (“Reflections” 838). Here Leibniz places his notion of a pre-established law of harmony in opposition to Hobbes’ notion of a sovereign, who “acts through the necessity of its power and not by the choice of its wisdom” (“Reflections” 399). Hobbes eres, according to Leibniz, because the Englishman sees God as a powerful sovereign who forces his dictates upon the ruled; in contrast, Leibniz asserts that humans follow God’s law because it constitutes a “wise” decision which conforms to the natural harmony of the universe. In Leibniz’ universe “laws of Nature are neither entirely necessary nor entirely arbitrary [...] they are a choice of the most perfect wisdom” (Theodicy 334). Conversely, in Leviathan, Hobbes states that laws are only properly called laws “if we consider [them] as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things” (111).

In a later discussion of the kingdom of God, Hobbes explains that “the Right of Nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth those that break his Lawes, is to be derived [...] from his Irresistible Power” (Leviathan 2: 246); for Hobbes, irresistible power rules by nature (Brown 414). “To those therefore whose Power is irresistible,” Hobbes adds, “the
dominion of all men adhereth naturally by their excellence of Power; and consequently it is from that Power, that the Kingdom over men, and the Right of Afflicting men at his pleasure, belongeth Naturally to God Almighty” (247). God forces humans to accept his will through power. Against this, Leibniz argues that justice, or right, must be founded in wisdom and goodness, “goodness guided by wisdom [...] makes the justice of God”; Leibniz adds that “Justice does not depend upon arbitrary laws of superiors, but on the eternal rules of wisdom and of goodness, in men as well as in God” (“Reflexions” 403). These rules are eternal and good because they reflect the rational, pre-established harmony of the universe. Hence, a sovereign does not force people to accept these rules through “Power,” but people would adopt these rules because they reflect the natural and rational order of the universe. Leibniz states this point in Theodicy where “precepts of natural law assume the reasonableness and justice of that which is enjoined, and that it would be man’s duty to practice what they contain” (242). Natural law reflects God’s laws; hence, if one chooses to follow natural law, then he or she must choose to follow the law ultimately that emanates from the harmony of the universe, the law of divine understanding.

Since one can acquire wisdom and goodness through conforming himself or herself to natural law, then one must ask how the truly virtuous person can be motivated to right action through conforming his ideas to this universal harmony. Leibniz argues that one would find motivation through God, who is, after all, a morally perfect being and the origin from which natural, just law springs (Brown 422). Leibniz argues that the connection between the virtuous man and God rests within reason where “God’s domain, the dominion of wisdom, is that of reason” (Theodicy 323) and, similarly, man’s “dominion is that of reason” too (Theodicy 322). However, man can will wrongly, whereas God “who always wills what is most to be desired [...] has no need of the power to change his will” (Theodicy 323). But, humans can perceive the just laws of nature because, “God, in giving [man] intelligence, has presented him with an image of the Divinity” (Theodicy 215). Hence, the virtuous man must observe the natural laws that God has established through the Pre-established Harmony to arrive at a natural “light of reason” (Theodicy 91), that will guide the virtuous man towards God’s perfection.

Here Leibniz provides his connection between the self and the other. When virtuous people follow the natural laws, then they will be lifted into a love of God, and through their shared experience of the love of God, individuals can form norms that would reflect the harmony of the universe. Simply put, one’s love of God will result in taking the greatest pleasure in willing what God wills, i.e., the common good. When one possesses a love of God, then he or she possesses a disinterested love for his or her fellow humans. For Leibniz the “necessity of good [...] becomes effective not through the mere essence of things, but through that which is outside them and above them, that is, through the will of God” (Theodicy 387). People become “good” to others through adopting God’s natural laws which exist outside and above them, and their love of God allows them to connect to one another. Leibniz expounds upon this notion of a virtuous connection to God:

This necessity is called moral, because for the wise what is necessary and what is owing are equivalent things, and when it is always followed by its effect, as it indeed is in the perfectly wise, that is, in God, one can say that it is a happy necessity. The more nearly creatures approach this, the closer do they come to perfect felicity. Moreover, necessity of this kind is not the necessity one endeavours to avoid, and which destroys morality. (Theodicy 387)

One follows this “necessity of good” because it reflects the “happy necessity” of God in which individuals reach outside of themselves, outside of their own personal concerns to connect to others. One would act in such a way that perpetuates the “necessity of good” “because one desires it” (Theodicy 387). This kind of desire represents, for Leibniz, love because this desire is independent of human questions of hope, of fear, and of regard for any question of utility. In truth, the happiness or “felicity,” of the other whose happiness pleases the subject turns into the subject’s own happiness, since things which please the individual are desired for their own sake (Brown 426). In turn, this felicity seeps down from God as the “constitution of the divine nature gives an entire satisfaction to him who possesses it,” and this divine nature pleases the individual because, “it is also the best and the most desirable from the point of view of the creatures who are all dependent upon God” (Theodicy 387). People desire this disinterested “necessity of good” to all others because it emanates from the goodness and wisdom of the perfect being. The love that the good person bears toward others is not selfless according to Leibniz because
everyone is dependent upon this love of God. Justice, then, demands that people love others disinterestedly and not seek their good solely as a means because human's felicity relies upon everyone's recognition of the “necessity of good,” and wisdom in God. Minds, or rational souls “capable of knowing the system of the universe” are uniquely lovable, Leibniz suggests, precisely because they are rational, “each mind being like a small divinity,” and because minds are rational, they reflect the “images of the Deity” (Monadology 270). Since individuals carry an image of God with them, others can see them in a disinterested manner and connect through the natural recognition of a residual deity within each person, which ultimately connects back to the wisdom and goodness of God.

As people begin to recognize the perfection of God through the scientific study of the cosmos, which reveals the order and beauty in God's works, people also come to recognize the perfection of the rational soul that imitates God. God has produced order and beauty in the universe, but the rational soul can imitate that creative act by discovering and coming to understand scientific theories which mirror the order exhibited in the world (Brown 428). In each case, people use their reason to observe the natural laws and to interpret how God has ordered the world in accordance to wisdom. Knowing and imitating God leads people to see the perfection of God in man. Those who “trust in Providence and who love and imitate, as is met, the Author of all Good, delighting in the contemplation of his perfections according to the nature of that genuine, pure love which finds pleasure in the happiness of those who are loved” will be a “wise and virtuous” person (Monadology 272). And this is precisely the degree of love that reason permits within individuals so that they may connect with others within a society.

Here we can outline the major difference in the two philosophers and expose the weakness in Leibniz’ connection between the self and other. Shaftesbury focuses on the internal, autonomous ordering of ideas in individuals as they create these ideas to communicate with others (a movement from internal to external), whereas Leibniz focuses on the person's interpretation of the external (God's law) and righting the internal (human's reasoning) with the perfectly constructed universe of God (external to internal). Here one can clearly see the connecting movements between the subject and objects of the world; Leibniz stresses the imposition of the other upon the individual while Shaftesbury highlights the externalizing of the subject into the outside world. Leibniz’ theory, in essence, echoes the role that Hobbes adopts with his God. Leibniz’ distinction between “power” and “right” proves ineffectual because the laws of God are the laws of the universe; God's laws are laws of the “right.” Even if these laws are defined in terms of wisdom and goodness, they still represent laws that the people must conform themselves to in order to elevate themselves into the realm of disinterested love. Leibniz exposes this problem in his own admission of his philosophy when he comments on Aristotle, “the principles of individual forms of knowledge depend on a superior knowledge which gives the reason for them; and this superior knowledge must have being, and consequently God, the source of being, for its object” (Theodicy 244). He, again, emphasizes this problem of external to internal imposition, “God is for us the only immediate external object, and that we see things through him” (Discourse 47). That is, people must necessarily observe and react to the world through the dictates of God. Leibniz simply manages to change Hobbes' rhetoric and places the weight on the individual in interpreting these laws out of his own sense of reasoned right, instead of Hobbes' God punishing because of his irresistible power. But at the same time, Leibniz' stress upon the individual interpreting those laws provides a bridge into Shaftesbury, where the individual must examine his natural and unnatural affections. In both Leibniz and Shaftesbury, the subject must be trained in some way to interpret the good, but Shaftesbury's relation of the individual to the good rests more upon the individual's ability to organize his own mind, rather than having the mind conform to an overarching deity in Leibniz' philosophy.

Shaftesbury avoids the pitfall of Leibniz' theory by focusing on the individual's sociability, which represents a relation between the subject's passions and the "system" of the outside world. Instead of focusing solely on the individual's strict conformity to an outside universe, like Leibniz, Shaftesbury stresses the role of "enthusiasm," passions, or sensibility in the individual's mind. Through sensibility, Shaftesbury believes, rather than in the thinking process, one can forge a connection to the world (Tuveson 417). The passions are, in fact, forms of sensibility (Tuveson 419) which respond to impressions received from the outside world, rather than motions of the soul towards what it imagines to be "good" in the love of God in Leibniz' case. Shaftesbury adds that if people will truly comprehend each other, then they must not limit themselves to observing and describing the mechanisms and physical laws governing them; what is significant is that the mind and the body both lead people into "Mind" — or
the mind collective. Like Leibniz, Shaftesbury notes that humans have a connection to an outside system ordered according to a universal balance, but for Shaftesbury, this connection is understood best when people examine themselves, their passions. Then, people can order these passions with the affections of the entire system, without being forced to solely recognize the “right,” or “wisdom” and “goodness” of God in order to flourish.

The effectiveness of Shaftesbury’s theory can be shown in its relation to Habermas’ notion of solidarity. Habermas uses solidarity to provide a means to account for the welfare of one’s fellow man. People must orient themselves to each other in discourse in such a way to recognize one another not only as equal persons but individuals who are unidentified by human concerns (Honneth 317). Individual concern applies to all human beings to the same degree, without privileging certain participants. For Habermas, solidarity allows all participants to reciprocally attend to the welfare of the other, with whom they also share, as equal beings, the process of communication. This concept of communication highlights the fundamental distinction between Leibniz and Shaftesbury, and the fundamental externalizing problem of Leibniz. Habermas speaks of a consciousness of one’s membership in an ideal communication community, and this consciousness arises from the certainty of intimate relatedness in a shared life context (Honneth 317). That is, everyone within a community must acknowledge that they share life experiences with each other, and people can acknowledge these shared experiences through creating collective goals. Because such collective experiences of shared burdens and hardships can develop only on the condition of collective goals, whose definition, however, is only possible in the light of commonly shared values, the development of a feeling of social membership remains necessarily bound to the presupposition of a community of discourse (Honneth 317). For this reason, one cannot conceive of solidarity without an element of particularism which is inherent in the development of every social community, as long as its members understand themselves as being in agreement on particular, ethically defined goals and thereby share the experience of specific burdens (Honneth 318). Through providing a means of connection through shared experiences and concerns, Habermas creates a bottom-up movement of ideals in which individuals with particular concerns externalize their desires within a social space, and those desires become externalized and actualized with the goals of the social community which they belong to.

Here the connections between the individual and the other in each of these philosophers’ thoughts can be effectively listed. For Habermas, the force that drives the connection between self and other begins in one’s membership in an ideal communication community. This connection in Leibniz finds itself in the love of God. In Shaftesbury, the individual’s enthusiastic recognition of his role within a Species, a System, in which he is intrinsically connected defines his or her connection to the other. Like Habermas’ idea of the communication community, Shaftesbury’s “System” functions as localized spheres of culturally developing thought in which internal ideas are actualized through their relationship to the other; the other becomes the method through which the individual can express herself. Leibniz attempts to accomplish this through his top-down concept of the love of God, but ultimately fails because he does not allow for the expression of the individual’s thought; in Leibniz, the other does not reflect the means by which the individual can express himself, but the end through which all individuals must conform. That is, Leibniz’ disinterested love is not the individual’s positioning within the system (as an agent), but the system’s positioning within the individual (as a receiver of information), which, as noted, ultimately leads Leibniz back to the problem he attempts to avoid in Hobbes’ notion of the powerful God/sovereign. When compared to Habermas’ and Shaftesbury’s theories, Leibniz’ “right” serves the same purpose as Hobbes’ “power”; both serve as methods of imposition, not as means of expression. Leibniz “right” based on wisdom and goodness functions only for people who observe the wisdom and goodness of God’s ordering of the universe. As a result, this wisdom and goodness may escape the observations of particular individuals (see Voltaire’s criticism of Leibniz in Candide). The individuals become a reflection of the overarching, controlling construction of the other, instead of the other becoming the overarching construction of all of the participants within the system. Instead of individuals reflecting the desires of each other to create the system, with Leibniz, everyone strictly reflects the demands of the overarching system, the order of the cosmos, as constructed by God.

In the divergence between Leibniz and Shaftesbury, one can observe the beginnings of a system of thought that defines contemporary discourse theory – the relationship between the self and the other, and where exactly this thought meets a crossroads. Shaftesbury’s methodology proves more attractive because Leibniz’ notion of an outside force presid-
ing over the connection between self and other, ultimately stifles and obstructs communication; individuals are forced to accept the terms of an outside notion of order (based upon a pre-established harmony). Shaftesbury's theory of the individual passions proves much more conducive to discourse because the passions allow individuals to foster their autonomous morals and gather in communities to externalize these into an environment that would best actualize their personal notions of good. Shaftesbury's and Habermas' theories still contain, however, residual problems inherent in Leibniz' theory. That is, at a certain point, the individual must come to terms with the external community around him or her; at that point, certain individuals might have to give up certain ideas or affections that they would like to keep. In Shaftesbury, it is when the individual organizes his passions in relation to the natural affections; in Habermas, it is when the people choose a specific discourse community in which to actualize their ideas. Contemporary critics have drawn attention to this problem which is similar to Leibniz' dilemma, but more localized. Indeed critics claim that even though Habermas' and Shaftesbury's theories attempt to account for as many voices as possible, through focusing on their personal notions of right, because one must move out into the realm of communicative action, certain voices will be silenced as participants of the discourse will ultimately have to accept terms of the discourse imposed by compromising with others (Chambers 233-34). Habermas moves this thought forward, though, by attempting to avoid complete restriction of the participants' voices, and he does this through adopting English notions of the individual, such as seen in Shaftesbury, where one can begin to account for individual differences in thought.

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Works Cited


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